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WATERSHED MANAGEMENT AND NONPOINT 
SOURCE POLLUTION: THE MASSACHUSETTS 
APPROACH 
Scott D. Anderson* 
N onpoint source pollution continues to frustrate the Clean Water 
Act's (CWA) promise of restoring and maintaining the integrity 
of our nation's waterways. Although programs exist within the 
CWA to assist states with abating nonpoint source pollution, 
these programs have not prevented nonpoint source pollution, or 
polluted runoff, from contributing an increasing load of pollutants 
to our rivers, lakes and streams. Recent case law has expanded 
the power of states, and in certain circumstances, citizens, to use 
the CWA to place restrictions on certain activities that are likely 
to damage water quality. However, the legal, social, and political 
limitations, both exerted on the case law and the CWA generally, 
will limit the practical further use of the CWA to stop nonpoint 
source pollution. Thus, another strategy is needed. Massachusetts 
has instituted a watershed-based resource management plan 
called the Massachusetts Watershed Initiative (MWI). The MWI 
promises to redefine environmental resource protection by involv-
ing local stakeholders in setting priorities for protecting local 
resources. By limiting the use of "command and control" regula-
tion, and by focusing on the watershed as the relevant environ-
mental entity, the MWI offers an alternative to traditional statu-
tory attempts to control nonpoint source pollution. 
INTRODUCTION 
After twenty-five years of water pollution regulation under the 
1972 Clean Water Act (CWA or the Act),! the control of nonpoint 
* Managing Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 1998-1999. 
The author wishes to thank his wife, Helen, and his daughter, Madeleine, whose patience and 
understanding made researching and completing this Comment possible. 
133 u.s.c. §§ 1251-1387 (1994). 
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source pollution continues to frustrate the CW.Pis stated goal to "re-
store and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of 
the Nation's waters."2 Nonpoint source pollution,3 or polluted runoff, 
remains a leading cause of water pollution in both agricultural and 
urban areas.4 Regardless of the large economic expenditures by in-
dustry and municipal wastewater systems to reduce point source 
pollution, forty percent of our nation's waterways still do not meet 
minimum federal guidelines.6 
Although programs to address non point source pollution exist in 
the text of the Act,6 this legislation has failed to result in meaningful 
protection of the nation's waterways from nonpoint source pollution.7 
Both the current section 319 and its predecessor, section 208, were 
enacted to assist states in identifying nonpoint source pollutants and 
reducing their effect on water quality.s Although these sections have 
resulted in some nonpoint source reductions, these programs have 
suffered from underfunding, agency inaction, and institutional and 
political setbacks.9 
Although the primary enforcement mechanism under the CWA is 
currently based on federal enforcement of effluent limitations, water 
quality standards set by the states may offer some protection from 
2 [d. § 1251(a). 
3 The CWA defines point source as: 
any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, 
ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concen-
trated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants 
are or may be discharged. This term does not include agricultural stormwater dis-
charge and return flows from irrigated agriculture. 
[d. § 1362(14). This term is summarized as point sources or point sources with conveyances. See 
id. Although the common use of point source suggests a pipe or other discrete discharge 
entering a waterway, construction equipment such as dump trucks, earth movers, and mobile 
irrigation systems (if not for agriculture) have been treated as point sources. 
4 See Farm, Urban Runoff, Municipal Sources 7bp Pollution Causes, EPA Tells Congress, 
[1993-1994] 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2228, 2228 (Apr. 29, 1994). 
5 See id. at 2229. A 1994 report released by the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) 
claimed that the CWA had resulted only in a partial success in cleaning up the nation's water-
ways. See Only Limited Success Made in Meeting CWA Goals in Past 20 Years, NRDC Says, 
[1993-1994l24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1071, 1071 (Oct. 3, 1993). The report documented that polluted 
runoff from agriculture, urban areas and other nonpoint sources was responsible for preventing 
125,000 miles of rivers, 2 million acres of lakes, 1.2 million acres of coastal areas, and 5000 square 
miles of estuaries from meeting minimum federal guidelines under the CWA. See id. 
633 U.S.C. §§ 1288, 1329. 
7 See Jerry L. Anderson, The Environmental Revolution at Twenty-Five, 26 RUTGERS L.J. 
395, 399 (1995). 
833 U.S.C. §§ 1288, 1329. 
9 See WILLIAM GOLDFARB, WATER LAW 225---30 (1988) [hereinafter WATER LAWl. 
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nonpoint source pollution.lO Several recent court decisions have ex-
panded the scope of state and citizen authority by allowing new 
restrictions on federally permitted activities that may affect water 
quality. 11 
This Comment argues that the current CWA is unable to prevent 
the further degradation of our waterways from non point source pol-
lution. Recent case law interpreting the CWA, although somewhat 
expanding the scope of the CWA to protect water quality standards, 
does not support an assertion that the CWA may be used to regulate 
nonpoint source pollution.12 Because of the limitations of the CWA, 
''watershed management" should be considered as an alternative to 
address nonpoint source pollution.13 Utilizing a multidisciplinary ap-
proach that considers the actions of a greater number of individuals 
and groups, watershed management offers an alternative to the tra-
ditional command and control mechanism of water pollution enforce-
ment.14 
Part I of this Comment summarizes the statutory attempts to 
regulate nonpoint source pollution before and after the passage of the 
1972 amendments of the CWA. Part II will analyze recent case law 
regarding the CWA as it applies to water quality standards, and 
specifically, nonpoint source pollution.16 These cases suggest that non-
point source pollution might be further regulated under the CWA 
through the use of state water quality standards.16 Part III will dis-
cuss the failure of the CWA to result in nonpoint source pollution 
abatement, along with the judicial, statutory, political, and institu-
tional factors that limit the application of the holdings of the cases 
discussed in Part II. Part IV will discuss watershed management 
alternatives to statutory regulation of nonpoint source pollution. Part 
10 See infra Part II. 
n See PUD No.1 Jefferson County v. Washington Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700,711 (1994); 
Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Dombeck, 151 F.3d 945, 948 (9th Cir. 1998); Northwest Envtl. 
Advocates v. Portland, 56 F.3d 979, 987 (9th Cir.1995); Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n. v. Thomas, 
940 F. Supp. 1534, 1541 (D. Or. 1996), rev'd, 151 F.3d 945 (9th Cir. 1998); see also infra Part II. 
12 See infra Part II. 
13 See generally William Goldfarb, Watershed Management: Slogan or Solution?, 21 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 483 (1994). 
14 See Robert W. Adler, Addressing Barriers to Watershed Protection, 25 ENVTL. L. 973, 977 
(1995). 
16 See generally Jefferson County, 511 U.S. at 700; Dombeck, 151 F.3d at 945; Northwest Envtl. 
Advocates, 56 F.3d at 979; Thomas, 940 F. Supp. at 1534. 
16 See generally Michael P. Healy, Still Dirty After Twenty-Five Years: Water Quality Stand-
ard Enforcement and the Availability of Citizen Suits, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 393 (1997). 
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V will analyze one watershed management project, the Massachusetts 
Watershed Initiative (MWI), and make recommendations for how the 
MWI can succeed where other watershed-based management plans 
have failed. 
I. STATUTORY ATTEMPTS TO ADDRESS NONPOINT SOURCE 
POLLUTION 
A. 1948 Federal Water Pollution Control Act & Water Quality 
Act of 1965 
The 1948 Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA)17 was 
enacted primarily to assist the states in preventing water pollution 
through technical grants and loans for building public wastewater 
treatment works.18 The 1965 Water Quality Act required individual 
states to set water quality standards to establish discharge limits for 
industrial and municipal discharges.19 
In practice, many commentators concluded that reliance on water 
quality standards under these statutes had been a failure.20 Prior to 
the enactment of the 1972 CWA amendments, the practice of states 
establishing acceptable concentrations of pollutants for different 
water bodies did not result in noticeable improvements in water 
quality.21 These state-set standards were to be used for formulating 
specific discharge limitations.22 However, not only were few states 
setting specific water quality standards, but many problems arose 
when states implemented these standards-including problems of 
determining when a discharge violated an established standard, and 
with identifying ways to allocate effluent limitations among different 
polluters. Moreover, industry commonly pressured states to reclassify 
their waterways to allow a greater pollutant load.23 
17 Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1165 (1948) (current version at 33 
u.s.c. §§ 1251-1387 (1994». 
18 See id. at § 5. 
19 See Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903 (1965) (current version at 33 U.S.C. § 1313); see also 
Theodore L. Garrett, Overview oftke Clean Water Act, in CLEAN WATER ACT HANDBOOK 5 
(Parthenia B. Evans ed., 1994) [hereinafter CWA HANDBOOK]. 
20 See WATER LAW, supra note 9, at 168-70. 
21 See J. GoRDON ARBUCKLE ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 66 (11th ed. 1991). 
22 See id. 
23 See id. 
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B. 1972 Amendments to FWPCA' the Clean Water Act 
The 1972 enactment of the CWA altered the course of protecting 
the nation's waterways from a reliance on water quality standards to 
the introduction of technology-based effluent limitations.24 This addi-
tion of discharge limitations to the prior, exclusive reliance on water 
quality standards reflected Congress's frustration with the failure of 
FWPCA and the 1965 Water Quality Act to result in cleaner water-
ways.26 
To address the weaknesses of the prior legislation, the 1972 amend-
ments, although technically retaining water quality standards as part 
of the enforcement mechanism, elevated technology-based discharge 
standards as the principal control mechanism for fighting water pol-
lution.26 However, the CWA was not silent on nonpoint source pollu-
tion, as it included two specific programs enacted to deal with polluted 
runoff.27 
1. Section 208 
Although the CW Pis primary goal was regulation of point sources, 
it also addressed nonpoint source pollution.28 Section 208 of the CWA 
required states to develop "area-wide waste treatment management" 
(AWTM) plans to identify nonpoint source pollution.29 In addition, 
section 208 required states to establish or designate an agency or 
other organization to develop and implement these AWTM plans.30 
These agencies would then develop procedures and methods to reduce 
and control nonpoint source pollution flowing from agricultural and 
other sources.31 Section 208 also provided federal funding to assist the 
states in the designation process.32 
Implementation of section 208 was problematic for several rea-
sons.33 States had virtually unlimited discretion in drafting AWTM 
24 See WATER LAW, supra note 9, at 170. 
25 See id. 
26 See id. 
27 33 U.S.C. §§ 1288, 1329. 
2B See generally Serena P. Wiltshire, Nonpoint Source Pollution Control, in CWA HANDBOOK, 
supra note 19, at 245. 
29 33 U.S.C. § 1288(b)(1)(A). 
30 [d. § 1288(b)(1)(B). 
31 [d. § 1288(b)(2)(F). 
32 See id. § 1288(0. 
33 See Adler, supra note 14, at 1043. 
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plans, and if a state refused to establish a plan, the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) did not have the authority to impose its own 
plan.34 In addition, not only was there limited guidance from EPA as 
to how to design the A WTM plans, but Congress also failed to provide 
sufficient funds for the grants program.36 The grant funding eventu-
ally was discontinued in 1981.36 Thus, for a number of reasons, the 
section 208 program failed to make any significant progress in limiting 
nonpoint source pollution.37 
2. Water Quality Act of 1987 & Section 319 of the CWA 
Congress attempted to fix the problems raised by the limitations 
of section 208 in the Water Quality Act of 1987 by adding section 319.38 
Although section 319 required stricter Best Management Practices 
(BMPs) for nonpoint source pollution, as well as tighter standards by 
which EPA evaluated and approved state plans, the states' decisions 
to create plans were still voluntary.39 EPA continues to lack the 
authority to require the states to take any affirmative action to limit 
nonpoint source pollution.4O 
3. Section 401 & Section 303: State Water Quality Standards 
a. Section 401 
Section 401, the "sleeping giant" of the CWA, may become more 
prominent in fighting nonpoint source pollution.41 Section 401 requires 
34 See Robert D. Fentress, Comment, Nonpoint Source Pollution, Groundwater, and the 1987 
Water Quality Act: Section 208 Revisited?, 19 ENVTL. L. 807, 818 (1989). 
35 See Adler, supra note 14, at 1044. 
36 See id. 
37 See id. at 1045. Although the statute remains on the books, its practical application has been 
limited by section 319 of the Water Quality Act of 1987. See id. at 1044; 33 U.S.C. § 1329. 
38 See Water Quality Act of 1987 § 319, (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1329). 
39 See David Zaring, Comment, Agriculture, Nonpoint Source Pollution, and Regulatory 
Control: The Clean Water Act~ Bleak Present and Future, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 515, 527 
(1996). 
40 See id. Like section 208, the failure to require states to submit nonpoint source management 
plans is fatal to section 319's effectiveness. See Fentress, supra note 34, at 825-27. A state may 
avail itself of the grant money by developing a plan under section 319. See 33 U.S.C. § 1329(h). 
Although the stricter reporting requirements under section 319 that require "satisfactory 
progress" in order to continue receiving funds are a stronger incentive to develop a good plan, 
EPA has not chosen to set a high standard for the continued receipt of funding. See Adler, supra 
note 14, at 1045 n.427. 
41 See Katherine P. Ransel, The Sleeping Giant Awakens: pun No.1 of Jefferson County v. 
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that an applicant for any federally permitted or licensed activity that 
might result in a discharge into navigable waters must obtain a sec-
tion 401 certificate from the state in which the discharge is likely to 
occur.42 States will grant certification under section 401 if and when 
the proposed activity complies with the state's water quality stand-
ards.43 As part of the permit process, states may grant or deny the 
certificate, waive section 401 certification, or set conditions that be-
come part of the federal permit.44 So far, states have not actively 
invoked section 401 to enforce water quality permit conditions.45 Even 
federal agencies have largely ignored the provision.46 
In order for states to exercise certification authority under section 
401, two initial threshold tests must be met.47 First, there must exist 
an application for a federally permitted activity, and second, the pro-
posed activity must be likely to result in a discharge into navigable 
waters.48 
With regard to the first threshold test, three federally permitted 
activities are clearly subject to section 401 certification: National Pol-
lutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits, permits for 
discharges of dredge and fill into wetlands under section 404, and 
licenses for operating hydroelectric facilities issued by the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).49 Activities that may re-
quire section 401 certification include permits for activities likely to 
affect navigation under sections 9 and 10 of the Rivers and Harbors 
Act (RHA), including the construction of dams and dikes in navigable 
waters.50 In addition, given that section 401 covers "any activity that 
may result in any discharge,"51 any federally permitted activity, in-
cluding special use permits issued by the Forest Service for activities 
Washington Department of Ecology, 25 ENVTL. L. 255, 268-{i9 (1995). "Sleeping Giant" is Ms. 
Ransel's term for section 401. For a general discussion of section 401 prior to the Supreme 
Court's opinion in Jefferson County, see generally Katherine P. Ransel & Erik Meyers, State 
Water Quality and Wetlands Protection: A Call to Awaken the Sleeping Giant, 7 VA. J. NAT. 
RESOURCES L. 339 (1988). 
42 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(I). 
43 See id. 
44 Id. § 1341(a)(2). 
46 See Deborah L. Donahue, The Untapped Power of the Clean Water Act Section 401,23 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 201, 204 (1996). 
46 See id. 
47 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1). 
48Id. 
49 See Donahue, supra note 45, at 219-20. 
60 See id. at 221. 
61 33 U.S.C. § 134l(a)(l). 
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conducted in national forests, special land use permits issued by the 
Bureau of Land Management, and incidental take permits under the 
Endangered Species Act, may require state certification.52 
With regard to the second threshold test, state certification under 
section 401 requires that the proposed activity is likely to result in a 
"discharge."5.'l Discharge is defined as any addition of dredged mate-
rial, sewage, garbage, or other waste material from any point source 
into navigable waters.54 Therefore, the scope of this requirement 
clearly includes activities that are likely to discharge any of the 
wastes specified in the definition through any traditional point 
source.66 Although the definition is explicit only with regard to point 
source pollution, some courts and commentators have suggested that 
because the definition of discharge "includes," but is not limited to, 
the list of point source pollutants, nonpoint sources of pollution may 
also be covered by section 401.56 
b. Section 303: State Water Quality Standards 
States ground their section 401 authority in the water quality stan-
dards they are authorized to set by section 303 of the CW A. 67 After 
the 1972 amendments, states that had not yet established acceptable 
water quality standards for navigable waterways were required to do 
so within 180 days of the Act's passage.56 Section 303 authorizes states 
to set these standards based on three considerations.69 First, states 
must establish the designated use of the waterway; second, states 
must establish specific criteria to protect the designated use; and 
third, states must develop criteria to prevent further degradation of 
the waterway.60 The EPA then accepts the state's standards if they 
are consistent with the standards of the CWA.61 In the alternative, 
62 See Donahue, supra note 45, at 226-28. Donahue admits in a footnote of this section that 
her list of other possible federal permits has not been subject to extensive scrutiny. See id. at 
226 n.135. 
63 33 U .S.C. § 1341(a)(1). 
64 [d. § 1362(12). 
65 See Donahue, supra note 45, at 226. 
66 See id. at 230. 
67 See Clean Water Act § 2, 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (1994). 
68 [d. § 1313(a)(3)(A). 
69 [d. § 1313(c)(2)(A). 
60 See id. 
6! [d. § 1313(a)(3)(B),(C). 
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EPA may promulgate its own standards if a state fails to set accept-
able standards.62 
II. RECENT CASE LAW ON SECTION 401 
Until 1994, the scope of the states' power under section 401 was 
uncertain. However, two cases from 1994 and 1995 expanded the 
power of states to condition or deny federal permits if the proposed 
activity threatened state water quality standards.63 These decisions 
suggest a trend in allowing states, and in some instances citizens,64 to 
deny or condition certain federal permits because of minimum stream 
flows65 or combined sewer overflows.66 In addition, one district court, 
eventually overturned on appeal, even allowed a citizen group to 
prevent the issuance of a federal grazing permit because of the likely 
effect of nonpoint source pollution on water quality.67 
A. The United States Supreme Court's Decision in PUD No. 1 of 
Jefferson County v. Washington Department of Ecology 
In PUD No.1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Department of 
Ecology (Jefferson County), the United States Supreme Court held 
that states have the authority to impose conditions on federal hydro-
electric permits granted by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion (FERC) to ensure that the operation of a proposed dam will not 
adversely affect state water quality.68 Specifically, the Court held that, 
as conditions of section 401 certification, states may impose minimum 
stream flows and other broad, narrative criteria to enforce water 
quality standards.69 
'!\vo aspects of the holding in Jefferson County are important for 
purposes of understanding the effect of the decision on future enforce-
ment of nonpoint source pollution.70 First, the Court held that 401 
applied to any applicant whose federally permitted activity may re-
62 33 u.s.c. § 1313(a)(3)(C). 
8S See generally PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700 
(1994); Northwest Envtl. Advocates v. Portland, 56 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 1995). 
64 See Narthwest Envtl. Advocates, 56 F.3d at 987. 
66 See Jefferson County, 511 U.S. at 714. 
68 See Narthwest Envtl. Advocates, 56 F.3d at 986. 
67 See Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Thomas, 940 F. Supp. 1534, 1540 (D. Or. 1996). 
68 See Jefferson County, 511 U.S. at 711. 
69 See id. at 715-16. 
70 See id. at 710, 721. In addition to the CWA issues, the Court rejected the claim that FERC 
has exclusive jurisdiction over hydropower licensing. See id. at 721. 
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suIt in a discharge into navigable waters.71 Therefore, states could add 
conditions to federal permits for activities that may result in a dis-
charge, and not merely conditions on point source discharge permits.72 
The Court's language clearly stated that section 401 compliance refers 
to the applicant, not the discharge.73 The Court's reasoning was de-
rived, in part, from the EPA regulations that specifically required 
states to confirm that applicants conduct the permitted activity in 
a manner that protects water quality.74 This reasoning greatly ex-
panded the power of the states under section 401 by allowing them to 
veto any federally permitted activity that might result in a discharge 
when the discharge is likely to threaten water quality.75 In so reason-
ing, the Court also held that because states could regulate activities 
as well as discharges, section 401 might apply to nonpoint source 
pollution.76 
The second important aspect of Jefferson County was the Court's 
conclusion that section 401 certification need not be limited to water 
quality standards that have been translated into specific, numerical 
criteria.77 The Court held that water quality standards consist of two 
components: the designated use, and any criteria to preserve that 
designated use.7S Therefore, any proposed activity that may result in 
a discharge into navigable waters must comply with water quality 
standards described both by applicable numerical criteria and the 
designated use.79 The Court further expanded this holding by stating 
71 See id. at 711. 
72 See id. Section 401(a) specifically states that the "discharge" must comply with the state 
water quality standards. 33 U .S.C. § 1341(a)(I) (1994). However, the Court based its reasoning 
on the language in section 401(d), which allows a state to condition approval to assure that any 
"applicant" complies with water quality standards. Id. § 1341(d). 
73 See Jefferson County, 511 U.S. at 711. 
74 See id. 
75 See id. at 711-12. 
76 See Ransel, supra note 41, at 269. Although the Court did not address this issue head on, 
the Court implicitly appeared to include the application of section 401 to nonpoint source 
pollution. See Jefferson County, 511 U.S. at 709--11; Donahue, supra note 45, at 210. The two 
"discharges" at issue in Jefferson County were the release of dredge and fill material during 
construction and the diversion of water from the Dosewallips River. See 511 U.S. at 708-00. 
Although the first discharge is definitely a point source, the technical term for the diversion is 
"hydromodification," a type of nonpoint source pollution expressly identified in the codified 
statute. See 33 U.S.C. § 1314(t)(2)(F). The diversion in Jefferson County was considered a 
nonpoint source because it did not contain pollutants. See, e.g., National Wildlife Fed'n v. 
Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 175 (1982). Therefore, in Jefferson County, the Court arguably applied 
section 401 certification to a nonpoint source. See Donahue, supra note 45, at 238. 
77 See Jefferson County, 511 U.S. at 714. 
73 See id. 
79 See id. 
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that a state may use ''broad, narrative" criteria, including maintain-
ing sthe "aesthetics" of the waterway, to describe the designated 
use.SO The Court rejected the defendant's argument that allowing 
enforcement of narrative water quality standards rendered the nu-
merical criteria requirement irrelevant.81 The Court reasoned that 
requiring the states to translate every water quality standard into 
numerical criteria would place too great a burden on the states.82 The 
Court concluded that it was "loath to attribute" this requirement to 
Congress without some specific textual support in the CWA.83 
In sum, under section 401, states may use numerical criteria, nar-
rative statements regarding designated use, or an antidegradation 
policy to condition or deny federal permits for any activity that may 
result in a discharge into a navigable waterway.84 
The Court in Jefferson County did not decide whether citizen 
groups could use section 401. However, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit eventually addressed the issue of citizen 
authority to enforce water quality standards in N orlhwest Environ-
mental Advocates v. Portland (NEA).85 
B. Citizen Suits and Northwest Environmental Advocates v. 
Portland 
Northwest Environmental Advocates v. Portland involved a dis-
pute regarding combined sewer overflows (CSOs) in the city of Port-
land, Oregon.86 Portland had obtained an extension of its 1984 NPDES 
permit because of ongoing negotiations with EPA over Portland's 
combined sewer system (CSS).87 In order to finalize the new permit, 
Portland entered into negotiations with Oregon's Department of En-
vironmental Quality (DEQ) regarding the eventual closing of the 
city's CSS.88 Before the EPA issued the new NPDES permit, a group 
80 See id. at 716. The Court also held that states can base section 401 certification on their 
antidegradation policy. See id. at 71S-19. 
81 See id. at 716. 
82 See Jefferson County, 511 U.S. at 718. 
BS See id. 
84 See id. at 723. 
85 56 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 1995). 
88 See id. at 980. CSO refers to the network of underground pipes that carry both wastewater 
and stonnwater collected by street drains. See id. In periods of wet weather, the amount of 
water in the system often exceeds the capacity of the wastewater treatment facility and is 
therefore directly released, untreated, through the CSO "outfall" pipes. See id. The cost of 
upgrading the city of Portland's system to completely eliminate the CSOs was estimated 
between $500 million and $1.2 billion. See id. at 981. 
In See id. at 982. 
88 See id. 
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of environmental organizations sued the city under the citizen suit 
provision of the eWA alleging that because the esos were not cov-
ered by the 1984 NPDES permit, Portland was discharging a pollut-
ant without a permit.89 The plaintiffs argued further that even if the 
esos were covered by the 1984 permit, they still violated Oregon's 
state water quality standards, and were therefore in violation of 
Portland's permit.90 
In August of 1991, four months after the plaintiffs filed suit, Port-
land entered into a settlement with DEQ.91 Although the settlement 
brought Portland's esos under the new permit, Portland agreed to 
replace the eso system within twenty years.92 
Regardless of the settlement, the plaintiffs maintained their allega-
tions that the state of Oregon was not enforcing its water quality 
standards.93 On cross motions for summary judgment, the district 
court in the NEA case ruled on two issues: first, that the 1984 NPDES 
permit covered Portland's esos, and second, that the eWA did not 
confer jurisdiction on the federal courts to hear claims by citizens to 
enforce water quality standards.94 The district court held primarily 
that because the water quality standards had not been translated into 
numerical effluent limitations, the plaintiffs could not utilize the citi-
zen suit provision to enforce "an effluent standard or limitation under 
this chapter."95 
The Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's ruling that the 1984 
permit covered Portland's esos.96 However, it reversed the district 
court's ruling regarding the federal court's jurisdiction to hear the 
citizen suit.97 In so deciding, the Ninth Circuit first established that 
conformity with the state's water quality standards was a condition 
of the final, 1991 NPDES permit.98 The court acknowledged that al-
89 See id. 
90 See Northwest Envtl. Advocates, 56 F.3d at 982. 
91 See id. 
92 See id. at 982. This case demonstrates how states have failed to rigorously set and enforce 
water quality standards under section 401. In this case, even though Portland received its 
section 401 certification from the state, it nevertheless faced a challenge by a citizen group that 
the state's certification process was deficient. 
93 See id. 
94 See Northwest Envtl. Advocates v. Portland, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19157, at *18 (D. Or. 
1991). . 
95 See id. at *14. 
96 See Northwest Envtl. Advocates, 56 F.3d at 983. 
97 See id. at 990. 
98 See id. at 985. The exact language was: "notwithstanding the emuent limitations established 
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though the water quality standards had not been translated into 
effluent limitations, such a process was not necessary for the condition 
to become enforceable by citizens under section 505 of the Act.99 The 
court further noted that the text of section 505 allowed citizens to sue 
not merely to enforce effluent limitations, but also to enforce "a permit 
or condition thereof."l°O Because compliance with water quality stand-
ards was a condition of the 1991 permit, and the plaintiffs were thus 
seeking to enforce a "condition thereof," the court concluded that it 
had jurisdiction to hear the claim.101 
The court then rejected the defendant's assertion that because the 
1972 CWA amendments replaced water quality standards with ef-
fluent limitations as the primary means of regulating water pollution, 
section 505 of the Act no longer allowed for the enforcement of water 
quality standards.102 The court reasoned that Congress intended only 
to improve water pollution enforcement with the addition of effluent 
limitations in the 1972 amendments, not to replace the prior system 
of water quality standards. loa In addition, even though the 1972 
amendments were the result of Congress's frustration with the failure 
of water quality standards to clean up the nation's waterways, the 
court found no evidence that Congress intended that only water 
quality standards translated into effluent limitations were enforce-
able.104 The court concluded that Congress intended the citizen suit 
provision to grant broad authority for citizens to prevent water pol-
lution.106 
The Ninth Circuit relied heavily on the Supreme Court's decision 
in Jefferson CountyyJ6 Because the Supreme Court had held that 
by this permit, no wastes shall be discharged and no activities shall be conducted which will 
violate Water Quality Standards as adopted (by state law)." [d. 
99 See id. at 986. 
100 See id. 
101 See Northwest Envtl. Advocates, 56 F.3d at 986. 
102 See id. 
103 See id. 
104 See id. 
106 See id. at 987. 
106 See PUD No.1 Jefferson County v. Washington Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700 (1994). In 
fact, the Ninth Circuit originally upheld the district court on the citizen suit claim. See North-
west Envtl. Advocates v. Portland, 11 F.3d 900 (9th Cir. 1993). However, while a motion by the 
plaintiffs for a rehearing en bane was pending, the Supreme Court decided Jefferson County. 
Afterwards, the Ninth Circuit stated that because the decision in Jefferson County "cast into 
considerable doubt our holding" in the initial appeal, their opinion was to be vacated and 
replaced with this opinion that granted jurisdiction to hear the citizen suit. See Northwest Envtl. 
Advocates, 56 F.3d at 981. 
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states could enforce broad, narrative criteria, and not just numerical 
effluent limitations in water quality standards, the Ninth Circuit in 
NEA similarly held that citizens could enforce water quality stand-
ards that had not been translated into numerical effluent standards.107 
The Ninth Circuit, however, took Jefferson County one step fur-
ther.1OB It held that citizen groups, as well as states, could enforce 
broad, narrative water quality standards.109 The court's reasoning was 
twofold: first, although the citizen suit provision involved enforcement 
of section 402 conditions, as opposed to the section 401 conditions in 
Jefferson County, both 401 and 402 required compliance with section 
301, which incorporated water quality standards.uo Therefore both 
the citizen suit provision under section 505 and the state's authority 
under section 401 granted citizens the authority to sue to enforce 
water quality standards.l11 Second, the Ninth Circuit found no statu-
tory language in either the CWA, its legislative history, or EPA's 
regulations that restricted citizens from enforcing any condition that 
states could themselves enforce.112 The court then repeated its rea-
soning that Congress intended citizens to have broad enforcement 
authority under the Act.113 
The Jefferson County and NEA decisions combine to allow states 
to condition or deny federal permits on the basis of broad, narrative 
criteria contained in water quality standards.114 If a state fails to 
enforce its authority, and compliance with the state's water quality 
standards are a condition of the federal permit, citizens may sue to 
enforce the standards if the state fails to do SO.115 N either Jefferson 
County nor NEA decided whether states or citizens could use water 
quality standards to impose restrictions on activities likely to cause 
nonpoint source pollution. However, it is reasonable to suggest that 
107 See id. at 987-88. 
lOS See id. 
109 See id. at 988. For criticism of this holding, and concerns about its practical use, see infra 
Part III. 
110 See id. 
III See Northwest Envtl. Advocates, 56 F.3d at 988. 
1\2 See id. 
113 See id. 
114 See PUD No.1 Jefferson County v. Washington Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 713-14 
(1994); Northwest Envtl. Advocates, 56 F.3d at 985. 
115 See Northwest Envtl. Advocates, 56 F.3d at 988. The obvious limitation here is that if the 
state fails to include compliance with water quality standards in the permit, i.e. if it fails to 
exercise its section 401 authority, citizens will not be able to sue to enforce water quality 
standards. See id. Of course, this section 401 process is conducted at the state level, where 
citizens participate and can bring pressure on the state to condition federal permits to include 
compliance with water quality standards. 
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if states and citizens are able to condition federal permits to protect 
water quality standards, this power would be illusory if section 401 
only applied to point source pollution, given the substantial impact of 
nonpoint source pollution on water quality. 
The viability of using section 401 to limit non point source pollution 
was subsequently addressed by the Oregon federal district court and 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.u6 
C. Section 401 and Nonpoint Source Pollution: Two Views 
Environmental advocates had a short-lived victory when a federal 
district court held in Oregon Natural Desert Association v. Thomas 
that section 401 could be used to condition federal permits for activi-
ties likely to result in nonpoint source pollution. ll7 This decision was 
subsequently overturned by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Oregon Natural Desert Association v. Dombeck.u8 Although Thomas 
was eventually reversed by Dombeck, other circuits are free to decide 
otherwise.u9 In addition, a discussion of both Thomas and Dombeck 
is helpful to understand the possibilities of, and limitations to, using 
section 401 to restrict nonpoint source pollution under the Clean 
Water Act. 
1. The Short-Lived Application of Section 401 to Nonpoint Source 
Pollution: The Oregon Federal District Court in Thomas 
The district court in Thomas discussed two issues: first, whether 
the term "discharge" in section 401 of the CWA included nonpoint 
source pollution, and second, whether citizens could invoke the citizen 
suit provision to enforce water quality standards before a state took 
action to deny or condition a federal permit. 120 
The petitioners in Thomas were a collection of environmental 
groups who claimed under the citizen suit provision of the CWA that 
the United States Forest Service should require applicants for federal 
grazing permits to apply for section 401 certification from the state in 
which the grazing would occur.121 Petitioners asserted that this per-
mitting process would ensure that grazing would not adversely affect 
116 See Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Dombeck, 151 F.3d 945 (9th Cir. 1998); Oregon Natural 
Desert Ass'n v. Thomas, 940 F. Supp. 1534 (D. Or. 1996). 
117 See Thomas, 940 F. Supp. at 1541. 
118 151 F.3d at 946. 
119 See infra notes 151-56 and accompanying text. 
120 See id. at 1536-37; 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994). 
121 See Thomas, 940 F. Supp. at 1537. 
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state water quality standards. l22 The Forest Service countered with 
two defenses. First, it claimed that the federal court did not have 
jurisdiction to review the citizen group's claim because section 505 of 
the Act did not allow citizens to sue to enforce water quality stand-
ards.l23 Second, the Forest Service claimed that the term "discharge" 
in section 401 included only point source pollution, or nonpoint source 
pollution with conveyances; therefore the CWA did not require sec-
tion 401 certification for a federal grazing permit.l24 
After finding that the plaintiffs had standing to sue,125 the court 
firmly rejected the Forest Service's argument that the court did not 
have jurisdiction to hear the CWA citizen suit.126 In so ruling, the court 
cited the holding in NEA, where citizens were allowed to enforce 
permit conditions through the citizen suit provision using either ef-
fluent limitations or water quality standards.127 
The court then found for the plaintiff environmental organizations 
on the nonpoint source claim.128 In evaluating the term "discharge," 
the court considered whether this term included only point source 
pollution.129 The court first stated that the term discharge "include[d] 
a discharge of a pollutant, and a discharge of pollutants," and further-
more that the terms "discharge of a pollutant" and "discharge of 
pollutants" meant "any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters 
from any point source."130 The court noted that the Forest Service 
argued in its briefs that the definition of these terms in section 
1362(12) specified point sources.l3l The court disagreed with this as-
sertion, explaining that the word "includes" in the initial definition of 
discharge allowed for additional, unstated meanings.l32 Therefore, the 
court held that the definition of discharge "includes," but is not limited 
to, point sources.133 
122 See id. 
123 See id. at 1540. 
124 See id. 
126 See id. at 1538. 
126 See Thom.as, 940 F. Supp. at 1538. 
127 See id. 
128 See id. at 1541. 
129 See id. at 1539. 
130 See id. at 1540; 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12), (16) (1994). 
131 See Thomas, 940 F. Supp. at 1540. 
132 See id. 
133 See id. Before continuing its discussion of the nonpoint source issue, the court dismissed 
the Forest Service's assertion that, as a federal agency, its interpretation of the term "dis-
charge" was entitled to deference by the court. See id. The court pointed out that the EPA, not 
the Forest Service, is the agency responsible for interpreting terms in the CWA, and therefore 
the Forest Service's interpretation of the term carries no particular weight. See id. 
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Finally, the court rejected the Forest Service's argument that the 
1972 Amendments to the CWA show the intent of Congress to replace 
enforcement of state water quality standards with the imposition of 
effluent standards.l34 Similar to the Ninth Circuit's decision in NEA, 
the court held that the 1972 Amendments to the CWA merely added 
effluent limitations to assist with the enforcement of water pollution, 
and did not replace the existing use of water quality standards.l36 The 
court further held that there was no evidence in the legislative history 
of the 1970 Act that Congress intended to limit water pollution en-
forcement to point sources, and moreover that the plain language of 
the term "discharge" in the 1972 Amendments was also not limited to 
point sources. l36 The court concluded that section 401 of the CWA 
applied to all federally permitted activities that may result in a dis-
charge, including nonpoint sources that are likely to have an effect on 
state water quality standards.l37 
2. The Ninth Circuit Reverses: The Dombeck Decision 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit specifically addressed the question of 
whether the certification requirement of section 401 includes releases 
from nonpoint source pollution. l3B First, the Ninth Circuit agreed with 
the district court that the citizens had standing to sue, and that the 
citizen suit provision allowed the group to sue the Forest Service for 
not issuing a section 401 certificate.l39 
However, the circuit court disagreed that section 401 certification 
applied to nonpoint source pollution.l40 The court noted that point 
source and nonpoint source pollution are regulated under different 
sections of the CWA.l4l The court cited sections 208 and 319, grant 
programs that encourage states to develop non point source pollution 
abatement plans.l42 Thus, regulation of nonpoint source pollution is 
limited to the "threat and promise" of federal grants, not the require-
ments of section 401.143 
134 See id. at 1541. 
135 See id. at 1540-41. 
136 See Thomas, 940 F. Supp. at 1541. 
137 See id. 
138 See Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Dombeck, 151 F.3d 945, 946 (9th Cir. 1998). 
139 See id. at 946--47. 
140 See id. at 948. 
141 See id. at 949. 
142 See id. 
143 See Dombeck, 151 F.3d at 949. 
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The Ninth Circuit rejected the district court's reasoning that the 
term "discharge" was not limited to point source pollution.144 Citing 
the District of Columbia Circuit in National Wildlife Federation v. 
Gorsuch,145 the court in Dombeck agreed that the term discharge had 
multiple meanings; however, the court disagreed with the district 
court that those meanings included point and nonpoint source pollu-
tion.146 Instead, the court held that the mUltiple meanings included 
only polluting and nonpolluting point sources-nonpoint source pollu-
tion was not a "discharge" under section 401.147 
The court continued that the term discharge differs from the term 
"runoff," which is used in the CWA to discuss nonpoint source pollu-
tion and urban wastewater plans.148 Other sections of the CWA spe-
cifically regulate activities likely to result in runoff that adversely 
affects water quality.149 Thus, if Congress had intended for section 401 
to apply to nonpoint source pollution, Congress could have so desig-
nated.150 
What is troubling about the Dombeck decision is the court's under-
lying reasoning regarding the relevance of the 1972 Amendments to 
the CWA.l5l In support of its decision, the court concluded that the 
change in enforcement from water quality standards to point source 
effluent limitations signaled the intention of Congress to focus on 
point source limits and leave the regulation of nonpoint source pollu-
tion to grants and other "threat and promise" programs.152 This rea-
soning is directly contrary to the Ninth Circuit's prior reasoning in 
NEA, where the court held that Congress only intended to improve 
upon water pollution enforcement with the addition of point source 
limits, not to replace the enforcement of water quality standards.153 
In NEA, the Ninth Circuit explicitly stated that there was no evi-
dence that Congress intended the 1972 Amendments to eliminate 
consideration of water quality standards. 1M 
144 See itt. 
146 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
146 See Dombeck, 151 F.3d at 950-51. 
147 See itt. 
146 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1288,1314(0 (1994). 
149 See id. at § 1323(a). 
160 See Dombeck, 151 F.3d at 950. 
151 See itt. at 948-49. 
152 See itt. at 949. 
159 See Northwest Envtl. Advocates v. Portland, 56 F.3d 979, 986 (9th Cir. 1995). 
154 See itt. 
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Therefore, although it is true that in the Ninth Circuit section 401 
may not be used to regulate nonpoint source pollution, other circuit 
courts should give pause before adopting the reasoning in Dombeck. 
If, as the Ninth Circuit held in NEA, maintaining compliance with 
water quality standards is still a concern of the CWA, then the inex-
tricable link between nonpoint source pollution and water quality 
standards must be acknowledged.l65 If Congress meant to abandon 
enforcement of water quality standards, as the Ninth Circuit sug-
gested in Dombeck, then further regulation of nonpoint source pollu-
tion under the CWA is less likely.1OO Further debate by the other 
circuits may help to clarify whether nonpoint source pollution may be 
regulated under section 401. 
III. FUTURE OF NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION ENFORCEMENT 
UNDER THE CLEAN WATER ACT 
Although a complete analysis of the effectiveness of the CWA in 
stopping nonpoint source pollution is beyond the scope of this Com-
ment, several observations suggest that the CWA, as currently writ-
ten and enforced, is not capable of preventing nonpoint source pollu-
tion from fouling our waterways. These limitations lead to this 
Comment's conclusion that, as an alternative to the CWA, watershed-
based management offers a better chance at limiting the damaging 
effect of nonpoint source pollution. 
Several factors contribute to this assessment. First, the track re-
cord of the CWA in preventing nonpoint source pollution is poor.167 
Second, political, social, and institutional limitations will prevent EPA 
and the states from using the existing framework of the CWA to 
improve nonpoint source pollution abatement. l68 Third, these political 
and institutional limitations will also restrict any use of Jefferson 
County and NEA to convince another circuit to allow section 401 to 
be used to regulate nonpoint source pollution.169 Finally, limitations in 
the citizen suit provision of the CWA remain to prevent citizens from 
166 See id. 
166 See Dombeck, 151 F.3d at 948-49. 
167 See supra Part 1.B.1-2. 
168 See generally Victor B. Flatt, A Dirty River Runs Through It (The Failure of Enforcement 
in the Clean Water Act), 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 1 (1997). 
169 See, e.g., Diarmuid F. Q'Scannlain, Current Trends in Judicial Review of Environmental 
Agency Action, 21 ENVTL. L. 1 (1997). 
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forcing states and EPA to take additional steps to combat nonpoint 
source pollution.l60 
A. Record o/the CWA in Stopping Nonpoint Source Pollution 
Many commentators identify the CW N.s failure to address nonpoint 
source pollution adequately as the greatest weakness of the Act.161 
Because the statute relegates nonpoint source pollution to secondary 
consideration at a time in which nonpoint source pollution is becoming 
the primary pollution source, the record of the CWA can only get 
worse.162 
1. N onpoint Programs 
Both the section 319 nonpoint source pollution grant program and 
its predecessor, section 208, suffer from limited funding and lack of 
state participation. l63 The incentives for states under section 319 have 
been limited, as Congress appropriated less than $50 million per year 
from 1990 to 1993.164 Congress may doubt state officials' confidence in 
the program.l65 This may partially explain the deficiencies in fund-
ing.l66 
To complement the lack of incentive for states to initiate a section 
319 program, EPA has no authority to force states to adopt nonpoint 
source pollution plans.167 If states fail to adopt a plan, EPA may submit 
its own plan to Congress and then work directly with local organiza-
tions conducting water pollution control programs. l66 However, the 
federal government has been reluctant to impose nonpoint source 
pollution requirements without state participation because of the po-
litical costs of imposing new regulations on powerful special interest 
groupS.169 Consequently, both the states and EPA have little incentive 
to promote tough limitations to reduce nonpoint source pollution un-
der section 319.170 
160 See, e.g., Healy, supra note 16. 
161 See Anderson, supra note 7, at 399. 
162 See id. 
163 See Adler, supra note 14, at 1044. 
164 See Zaring, supra note 39, at 527. 
166 See id. 
166 See id. 
167 See id. 
168 See id. 
169 See Zaring, supra note 39, at 527-28. 
170 See id. 
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Also, regarding the funds available for local groups and municipali-
ties to conduct nonpoint source pollution abatement programs, the 
application process can take up to a year and a half. l7l This delay is 
burdensome on local organizations who cannot normally wait long to 
be reimbursed for grant work.172 
2. Institutional Limitations 
In addition to the problems associated with the substance of the 
text of the CWA, institutional limitations, such as lack of funding and 
enforcement zeal, characterize the CW Ns attempts to deal with non-
point source pollution.l73 Also, the record of the states in enforcing 
both point and nonpoint source limits still suffers from both political 
limitations and the incentive to weaken enforcement to attract new 
industrial development.174 
a. Lack of Funding and Enforcement Zeal 
Even in the first decade following the passage of the 1972 amend-
ments, EPA's enforcement record of the CWA was poor.176 From 1977 
to 1982, enforcement actions declined 73.1%.176 This coincided with a 
drop of 25.5% in the number of permanent full-time personnel as-
signed to CWA enforcement.177 This period of weak enforcement oc-
curred during a time when a survey of 531 polluters from 1980 to 1982 
showed that 82% of these sources had violated their permits at least 
one time.178 
However, EPA does not bear the entire blame-Congress intended 
that it was the state's primary responsibility to prevent water pollu-
tion, and lack of state enforcement is equally to blame for CWA 
171 See Interview with Ed Himlan, Executive Director of the Massachusetts Watershed Coa-
lition (MWC), Mar. 10, 1998. The MWC recently used section 319 money to fund an educational 
campaign entitled "H20me Check," which outlined steps for homeowners to reduce introducing 
pollution into surface and ground water supplies. See id. The campaign suggested the use of 
alternatives to harsh household chemicals, reducing the amount of chemical fertilizers and other 
lawn products, and conserving water use with low flow shower heads. See id. 
172 See id. 
173 See Flatt, supra note 158, at 4-5. 
174 See id. at 5~. 
176 See William L. Andreen, Beyond Words of Exhortation: The Congressional Prescription 
for Vigorous Federal Enforcement of the Clean Water Act, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 202, 204-{)5 
(1987). 
176 See id. at 204. 
177 See id. at 205. 
178 See id. (citing U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WASTEWATER DISCHARGERS ARE 
NOT COMPLYING WITH EPA POLLUTION CONTROL PERMITS 24 (1983». 
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violations.179 Under the CWA, states may petition EPA for the right 
to administer the NPDES permit program.l80 This state-federal part-
nership is intended to balance the need for uniform federal standards 
with flexibility for states to tailor discharge requirements to meet 
local conditions.181 
Once states have the authority under their state programs to issue 
and enforce NPDES permits, EPA's oversight authority is limited.l82 
Any threat that EPA will revoke the states' authority is limited both 
by political pressures on EPA, and by the complex regulatory process 
that EPA must initiate to remove this authority from a state that fails 
to zealously enforce its responsibilities. l83 Also, funding limitations at 
EPA makes state administration of the NPDES permits very attrac-
tive, and thus removes EPA's incentive to accept the financial respon-
sibility that accompanies CWA enforcement. l84 
In addition, data to monitor whether the states are in compliance 
with the NPDES permitting program is incomplete, further clouding 
the issue. l85 Moreover, CWA enforcement often deals with sensitive 
local policy and political choices in which EPA is loath to involve 
itself. 185 
b. Second-Class Status of Water Quality Standards 
With regard to nonpoint source pollution, the picture is even 
bleaker. The problems of lack of enforcement zeal, limited funding, 
and state complacency in the face of CWA violations are exacerbated 
when applied to nonpoint source pollution. This is in part because the 
1972 amendments changed the focus of the CWA from protecting 
water quality to imposing technology-based limitations on point 
source discharge.187 Although Congress stated that the discharge lim-
its were only to improve upon, not replace, water quality standards, 
179 See Flatt, supra note 158, at 15. 
180 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1994). 
181 See Flatt, supra note 158, at 15. 
182 See id. at 15-16. 
183 See id. 
184 See id. 
186 See William F. Pedersen, Jr., Turning the Tide on Water Quality, 15 ECOLOGY L.Q. 69, 96 
(1988). 
186 See id. Overriding state decisions on issues ofland use planning and economic development 
seriously strains the federal-state partnership in cleaning up water pollution. See id. at 72. 
187 See id. at 72-73. 
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in practice this change in the CWA makes enforcement of nonpoint 
source pollution more difficult.l88 
Regardless of the enormous expenditures by industry and munici-
palities to meet NPDES permit requirements, overall water quality 
continues to decline because of pollution from nonpoint sources.189 The 
second-class status of water quality in the CWA gives states no in-
centive to develop procedures to limit non point source pollution.l90 
Ignoring nonpoint source pollution can also erode support for the 
CWA as a whole.191 As traditional point source polluters realize that 
declining water quality is due to unregulated nonpoint sources, resis-
tance to future tightening of technology-based limits is inevitable.l92 
c. Explicit Exemptions for Certain Nonpoint Sources 
Finally, certain nonpoint sources are explicitly exempt from the 
CWA.l93 For example, storm sewer discharges are exempt from 
NPDES permits, and in those cities where CSOs are a significant 
contributor to water pollution, EPA often allows wide latitude in 
setting a timetable for fixing CSO systems.l94 
The 1987 amendments to the CWA added exemptions for runoff 
from mining and oil operations and small storm sewers.195 The 1987 
amendments also added an unqualified exemption from NPDES per-
mits for agricultural stormwater runoff. l96 By removing agricultural 
stormwater runoff and limiting the enforcement of urban stormwater 
discharges, these exemptions to the CWA significantly interfere with 
efforts to improve water quality.l97 
B. Future Application of Case Law on Section 401 
If the structure of the CWA and the reluctance of EPA and the 
states to vigorously enforce water pollution have failed to reduce 
nonpoint source pollution, do the holdings of Jefferson County, NEA, 
188 See id. at 82. 
189 See Farm, Urban Runoff, Municipal Sources Top Pollution Causes EPA Tells Congress, 
[1993-1994] 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2228, 2228-29 (Apr. 29, 1994). 
190 See Pedersen, supra note 185, at 85. 
191 See id. at 82--83. 
192 See id. 
193 See id. at 91-92. 
19<1 See id. at 91. 
196 See Pedersen, supra note 185, at 91. 
196 See id. at 92. 
197 See id. 
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or the reasoning of the Oregon district court in Thomas, discussed in 
Part II, hold any hope? 
First, the holding of Jefferson County relies on the states to act to 
enforce permit conditions.198 The decision is limited to those states 
that have already taken steps to limit nonpoint source pollution.l99 
However, the decision is not applicable to states that either fail to take 
an affirmative and aggressive stance on nonpoint source pollution or 
have been guilty of weak enforcement of NPDES permits. 
If states continue to fail to address nonpoint source pollution, how-
ever, the holding of NEA holds some promise for citizens to step in 
where EPA and the states fear to tread. In NEA, the Ninth Circuit 
granted a citizens group the right to sue to enforce NPDES permit 
conditions that the state of Oregon had failed to vigorously enforce.2OO 
Although this holding seemed to give citizen groups the power to 
force states to enforce their state water quality standards, the holding 
has a significant limitation: citizens may sue only to enforce a permit 
condition.201 If the state of Oregon subsequently removed the refer-
ence to state water quality from the NPDES permit, the citizens 
group would no longer have a claim.202 The Ninth Circuit explicitly 
distinguished this case from others where citizen groups were not 
allowed to enforce water quality standards when those standards 
were not part of NPDES permits.203 Therefore, the states may still 
limit the power of citizens to force the state to act by choosing not to 
include water quality standards as a condition of the NPDES permit. 
Finally, even if a district court in another circuit adopted the Ore-
gon district court's reasoning in Thomas that citizens can sue to limit 
activities that might result in nonpoint source pollution, the states still 
have primary control over the process.204 
The district court in Thomas first reaffirmed the right of citizens 
to sue to enforce water quality standards as part of a federal permit.205 
The court then expanded the scope of section 401 of the CWA to cover 
nonpoint sources of pollution.206 The court did not hold, however, that 
196 See PUD No.1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 704 (1994). 
199 See ill. 
200 See Northwest Envtl. Advocates v. Portland, 56 F.3d 979, 986--87 (9th Cir. 1995). 
201 See ill. at 986. 
202 See ill. 
203 See ill. at 989 n.ll. 
204 See Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n v. Thomas, 940 F. Supp. 1534, 1538 (D. Or. 1996). 
206 See ill. 
200 See ill. at 1540. 
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citizens could force a state to condition federal permits on compliance 
with state water quality standards-it merely held that applicants 
needed to receive state certification under section 401.207 Once again, 
if the states fail to enforce their authority, the reasoning of Thomas, 
notwithstanding its rejection by the Ninth Circuit, may not provide 
any new tool to force states to act to curb nonpoint source pollution. 
C. Limitations on Citizen Suits to Enforce Water Quality 
Standards 
Finally, even if existing case law were to grant citizens greater 
power in enforcing water pollution controls, several arguments sug-
gest that citizen enforcement suits are not the best way to deal with 
water pollution.208 Although citizen suits are an important part of 
enforcement under the CWA, excessive reliance on citizens and courts 
to resolve disputes over CWA violations raises several concerns.209 
First, courts may be forced to exceed their capabilities in balancing 
highly technical considerations to resolve disputes; second, permit 
holders may be treated unfairly by the courts; and third, excess 
reliance on citizens suits may result in inefficient enforcement.21o 
As opposed to litigating a violation of a NPDES permit-where 
courts are required to compare the discharge with the standard-liti-
gating violations of state water quality standards requires a more 
sophisticated analysis by courts.211 In cases involving nonpoint source 
pollution, it is often difficult to identify who is responsible for declining 
water quality. Therefore, in a river system where point and nonpoint 
sources contribute to declining water quality, targeting anyone pol-
luter as the responsible party requires a balancing of both scientific 
information and controversial policy choices.212 In any event, if courts 
are left to decide whether agricultural runoff, not the point source 
polluter, is responsible for water quality violations, courts may be 
forced to make decisions that are better left to the legislature.213 
This balancing of pollution leads to a second problem with citizen 
suit enforcement of water quality standards: fairness.214 If a polluter 
207 See id. 
208 See Healy, supra note 16, at 443. 
209 See id. 
210 See id. 
211 See id. at 444. 
212 See id. at n.W. 
213 See Healy, supra note 16, at 445. 
214 See id. at 449-50. 
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is in compliance with its NPDES permit, but the receiving water still 
fails to meet water quality standards, the polluter is likely to argue 
that other sources are responsible for the degradation. In such a case, 
it would be unfair to hold the polluter responsible for the acts of 
another NPDES permit holder, or worse, an exempt nonpoint source 
of pollution.216 
The final concern with citizen suits is that such suits would result 
in unacceptable social costs if the CWA were enforced to require 
compliance with every state water quality standard.216 Enforcement 
authorities will often, under their discretion, not enforce statutory 
provisions that, if enforced to the letter of the law, would be too 
burdensome and unreasonable for permit holders.217 Some commenta-
tors have even suggested that because there is no political or social 
mandate for regulating nonpoint sources of pollution to a higher de-
gree, the public in fact supports weak enforcement of nonpoint source 
pollution.218 Also, even if over-regulation of certain types of pollution 
might be in the interest of an issue-oriented citizen group, it might 
not make sense to the public at large.219 
Because of the limitations of citizen suits and the inherent problems 
with addressing nonpoint source pollution under the text of the CWA, 
an alternative mechanism for dealing with nonpoint source pollution 
is needed. 
IV. ALTERNATIVE To RELIANCE ON CWA: WATERSHED 
MANAGEMENT 
Like the term "sustainable development," "watershed manage-
ment" conjures up notions of a utopian solution to past failures in 
215 See Northwest Envtl. Advocates v. Portland, 56 F.3d 979, 992 (9th Cir. 1995) (Kleinfeld, J., 
dissenting). 
216 See Healy, supra note 16, at 451. 
217 See id. 
218 See id. at 452. 
219 See Narthwest Envtl. Advocates, 56 F.3d at 992-93 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). Judge Klein-
feld suggested a hypothetical where a citizen group concerned with speeding automobiles is 
allowed to enforce speed limits with citizen enforcement. See id. (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting). The 
judge suggested that a "public interest advocacy group" might have an incentive to ticket 
anyone who drives even one mile per hour over the limit. The additional burden on the courts 
would be greatly disproportionate to the minimal advancement in public safety. See id. (Klein-
feld, J., dissenting). Although this analogy is helpful, it assumes that the police have identified 
the most efficient balance between public safety and administrative burden. If the states are 
currently prosecuting water quality violations at the most efficient level, then citizen suits would 
be unproductive. Arguably, however, citizen groups often play an important role in insuring that 
the "police" are "ticketing" at the right "speed." 
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ecosystem protection. The simplicity of the term belies the complex 
web of ecological, political, and social issues that must be addressed 
when developing a watershed protection program.220 
A watershed is a "geographic area in which water, sediments, and 
dissolved materials drain to a common outlet-often a point on a 
larger stream, a lake, an underlying aquifer, an estuary, or an 
ocean."221 River watersheds are identified and bounded by the line 
drawn along the tops of surrounding high ridges where rain and 
surface water drain into the river, or the "drainage basin" of the 
river.222 
This simple definition of watershed becomes more complicated 
when the term "management" is attached to discuss comprehensive, 
multidisciplinary programs in water resource management.223 The ex-
act meaning of watershed management can change depending on the 
perspectives and priorities of the individual or group that offers the 
definition.224 Watershed management seeks to protect ecological re-
sources and human health, and promote equitable and economically 
feasible solutions to environmental problems by involving a larger, 
decentralized group of interested parties, or "stakeholders" in the 
decisionmaking process.226 
A. Baseline Issues in Watershed Management 
Although the term "watershed management" is difficult to define, 
the underlying problems it seeks to address are easy to identify.226 
1. Ecological Challenges 
Watershed management programs attempt to address a compre-
hensive mix of water use and protection problems.227 Included in the 
scope of environmental factors considered are chemical water quality, 
such as toxic and conventional pollutants, and physical water quality, 
including temperature, minimum stream flows, circulation, and 
220 See Goldfarb, sutyra note 13, at 483. 
221 See id. at 484 (citing U.S. EPA, THE WATERSHED PROTECTION APPROACH: AN OVERVIEW 
(Dec. 1991)). 
222 See id. 
223 See U.S. EPA, Watershed Protection: A Statewide Aptyroach 1.4 (last modified Feb. 26, 
1996) <http://www.epa.gov/OWOW/watershed/statelchap1.html> [hereinafter EPA REPORT]. 
224 See Adler, supra note 14, at 976. 
225 See id. 
226 See supra Part III. 
227 See EPA REPORT, supra note 223, at 1.4. 
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ground and surface water interaction.228 Other factors include the 
biological health and diversity of the watershed, involving species 
diversity and habitat protection, and subsurface water protection.229 
These environmental concerns fall into three hydrological catego-
ries.230 First, water (and accompanying pollution) is carried from up-
stream areas to downstream areas; second, water passes between 
surface and sub-surface sources; and third, water runs from upland 
areas to the floodplains.231 Because the ecological health of the water-
shed is affected by any activity that occurs on or below the land within 
the watershed, and because the water passes within and among these 
water-flow systems, a comprehensive watershed management ap-
proach hopes to reduce a greater proportion of the pollution load 
entering waterways from a diversity of sources to ensure that the 
resource will be protected.232 Artificial distinctions between different 
''types'' of water pollution, prompted by separate statutory and regu-
latory attempts to regulate navigable water, drinking water, and pol-
luted runoff ignore this integrated relationship between surface and 
sub-surface water systems.233 
2. Institutional and Political Problems 
Watershed boundaries and political subdivisions often do not coin-
cide.234 Landuse activity in one town, state, or region can have a 
detrimental effect on water quality a great distance away.235 In addi-
tion to "issue fragmentation" discussed above, where different stat-
utes regulate interrelated actions, this "political fragmentation" 
among the different local, state, and federal agencies that exercise 
overlapping jurisdictions within watersheds creates institutional con-
flict that must be addressed in any comprehensive watershed man-
agement planP6 
228 See id. 
229 See id. 
230 See Adler, supra note 14, at 982. 
23\ See id. 
232 See id. 
233 See id. Current criticism of point source regulation as inefficient underlies this point. See 
Pedersen, supra note 185, at 83. Given that the CWA favors the consistent implementation of 
discharge standards for similar industrial and municipal sources regardless of the ambient water 
quality of the receiving waterway, under and overregulation are a constant problem. See id. In 
addition, with over half of the pollution entering waterways from nonpoint sources, further 
regulation of point sources is ineffective and inefficient. See id. at 71. 
234 See EPA REPORT, supra note 223, at 1.5. 
236 See id. 
236 See Adler, supra note 14, at 991. 
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On the federal level, thirteen congressional committees, eight cabi-
net agencies, six independent regulatory agencies, and the White 
House are involved in water policy planning.237 At the state level, 
more than 300 departments exist to regulate water use and pollu-
tion.238 Also, poor water quality, which is regulated by the state and 
federal governments, is often linked to land use, which is regulated 
by local government. This vertical regulatory division is not conducive 
to a comprehensive plan to protect water resources.239 
3. Individual Behavior Issues 
Locallanduse decisions have a large impact on water quality, and 
these decisions usually involve the regulation of individual behavior.240 
Regulations that decide where houses can be built, which trees can 
be cut down, or whether cattle can drink out of a river, are difficult 
political (and sometimes constitutional) choices that are avoided by 
traditional regulatory approaches to water protection.241 By relying 
primarily on regulation of industrial and municipal discharges, the 
general public has only indirectly contributed to cleaning up our wa-
terways through higher consumer prices and sewer bills.242 
B. Past Attempts at Watershed Protection 
1. Federal Programs 
In addition to the CWA, a long list of federal legislative initiatives 
have attempted to encourage watershed management.243 Prior to the 
CWA and its predecessors, proposals for watershed-based resource 
287 See Goldfarb, supra note 13, at 485. 
238 See ill. Also, state water use rights such as ''prior appropriation," "reasonable use," or 
"absolute ownership" often conflict with state and federal water protection standards. See id. 
at 486. 
I!3Il See ill. at 485. Goldfarb contends that land use and water quality are inextricably linked; 
water is a basic resource with development requiring both a clean water source, and a water 
system that accepts waste discharges within or nearby the watershed system. See ill. 
240 See Pedersen, 8Upra note 185, at 71. 
241 See ill. 
24Il See Scott Allen & Judy Rakowsky, 300 Burn MWRA Bill8 in Chelsea, BOSTON GLOBE, 
May 14, 1993, at 25. It would, however, be misleading to suggest that these "indirect costs" have 
not raised protests. Rising water and sewer bills that resulted from the Boston Harbor Cleanup 
created social and political unrest in and around Boston in the 1980s when groups burned their 
water bills in protest. See ill. This demonstration, and others like it, led to a reduction in the 
scope of the Deer Island Wastewater Treatment project, and therefore were a limitation on the 
state and federal agencies involved with the cleanup. See ill. 
243 See Adler, supra note 14, at 1004 n.I66. 
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management arose during the 1930s and 1940s in proposals by the 
National Planning Board, the Water Resources Committee of the 
National Resources Commission (NRC), and the National Resources 
Planning Board (NRPB).244 These programs all advocated a compre-
hensive approach that involved all available resources in a unified pro-
gram for conservation and water allocation.245 These programs were 
similar to today's watershed-based management proposals in that 
they recognized the intimate relationship between land use and water 
quality protection.246 However, although these proposals pledged a 
multidisciplinary approach to managing water resources, Congres-
sional opposition to the centralized planning essential to carrying 
them out eventually led to their demise.247 
a. Flood Control Legislation 
Flood control legislation focused primarily on human use of water 
and water-based economic development projects such as the ''break-
neck dam construction" under the Tennessee Valley Authority Act.248 
Similarly, flood control legislation from 1936 to 1954 reflected the 
common "capture" of comprehensive water resource management 
plans by agencies that focused on development and construction pro-
jects that subverted the original goals of conserving natural re-
sources.249 
244 See id. at 1007. 
246 See id. at 1007-08. 
246 See id. at 1008. 
247 See id. at 1009. The proposal for a National Resources Planning Board was dismissed by 
Congress as un-American and was eliminated in 1942. See id. at 1009. Prior attempts at 
watershed based management in the first decades of the 20th Century also faced strong 
opposition on institutional grounds. See id. at 1006. The 1908 Inland Waterways Commission, 
the 1909 National Conservation Commission, the 1912 National Waterways Commission and the 
1917 Newlands Commission all contained elements similar to modem day watershed manage-
ment plans, including goal coordination, inter-agency cooperation, multidisciplinary planning, 
and linking land and water use. See id. at 1005. These early plans also fell victim to power 
struggles between the President and Congress over control of resource protection. See id. at 
1006. 
248 See Adler, supra note 14, at 1060. In addition to the TVA, the 1920 Federal Power Act 
created the Federal Power Commission (FPC) (now the Federal Energy Regulatory Commis-
sion or FERC) creating a single federal permitting agency for dams on navigable waters and 
federal lands. See id. at 1019. The primary purpose of this statute was to regulate and promote 
the development of hydropower facilities. See id. at 1020. However, even on this issue, the FPC 
did not coordinate its efforts with any other agency responsible for water resource management 
and it was not until 1986 that the agency was required to consider fish habitat and wildlife and 
environmental values in its permitting decisions. See id. at 1022. 
249 See id. at 1023. 
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The operation of the 1936 Flood Control Act is an example of these 
conflicting goals.260 Although the initial intent of the Flood Control Act 
was to encourage information collection for watershed planning, the 
information was actually used to determine the impact of proposed 
hydropower and flood control projects on navigable waterways.261 In 
addition, the legislation allowed for, but did not require, interagency 
cooperation in addressing the environmental impacts of development 
projects.262 Subsequently, the cooperation that resulted under the Act 
was limited to the Army Corps of Engineers sending the collected 
input of other agencies to Congress whenever the Army proposed 
recommendations for certain hydro-power projects.263 
b. 195.4 Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention Act and Soil 
Conservation Service 
The 1954 Watershed Protection and Flood Prevention Act im-
proved upon prior flood prevention legislation with the creation of the 
"Small Watersheds" program.2M This program was administered by 
the Soil Conservation Service (SCS), an agency within the Depart-
ment of Agriculture.266 The operation of the Small Watersheds pro-
gram differs from prior attempts at flood control because under the 
program, landuse controls to reduce agricultural runoff were added to 
dam projects to control flooding.256 In addition to considering landuse 
issues, the SCS coordinated erosion control efforts governed by water 
erosion committees that considered local and regional problems.267 
Even though the program was voluntary, many farmers participated 
by engaging terraced land treatment, crop rotations, controlled live-
stock grazing, and revegetation projects along waterways.258 
The operation of the SCS has continued virtually unchanged since 
1954.269 It is an important example of a "bottom-up" management 
system in which local individuals who are familiar with the problems 
260 See 1936 Flood Control Act §§ 1-9,33 U.S.C. § 701(a)-(t), (h) (1994). 
261 See id. § 701; Adler, supra note 14, at 1026. 
262 See 33 U.S.C. § 701(a). 
268 See Adler, supra note 14, at 1026. As with other flood control measures, the 1936 Flood 
Control Act focused on engineering solutions to control rivers so as to "improve" them. See id. 
at 1027. Nowhere in the statute were there provisions to adjust land use to minimize runoff and 
irresponsible development. See id. 
254 See WATER LAW, supra note 9, at 85. 
266 See id. 
266 See id. at 86. 
267 See Adler, 8upra note 14, at 1029. 
268 See id. at 1030. 
269 See id. 
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in their area develop systems of dealing with water resource issues.260 
Although the SCS did not require local farmers' participation, the 
SCS has been successful because local individuals were not beholden 
to some faceless bureaucrat in Washington, D.C.261 In addition, the 
success of the SCS may also be attributed to the cost-sharing between 
the federal government and the local organizations administering the 
program.262 This process has prevented the local groups from becom-
ing dependent on federal subsidies for the soil conservation projects, 
and has thus resulted in better managed, more efficient projects that 
meet local needs without wasting unnecessary federal resources.263 
c. Federal Navigation Laws 
Congress has given statutory authority to the Army Corps of En-
gineers to maintain navigable waterways beginning with the Rivers 
and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1884.264 Prior to the most recent 
change in 1986, the Army Corps was authorized to maintain naviga-
tion by constructing and dredging harbors, and other projects that 
provided for the safe passage of ships.266 Although the Army Corps 
had discretionary authority to consider environmental issues such as 
building fish passages, Congress and the Army were still primarily 
interested in human-centered uses of navigation and power crea-
tion.266 
In 1986, Congress passed the Water Resources Development Act. 
This Act provided for studies of the Army's ability to protect fish and 
wildlife, required consideration of nonstructural alternatives to navi-
gation projects and balancing for benefits of ecosystem protection, 
and provided funding for environmental resource mitigation.267 
260 See id. 
261 See id. at 1028-80. 
262 See WATER LAW, supra note 9, at 86-87. 
283 See Adler, supra note 14, at 1031. 
264 See 33 U.S.C. § 5 (1994). 
266 See Adler, supra note 14, at 1035 (citing River and Harbor Improvements Act, 33 U.S.C. 
§§ 540--633 (1994». 
266 See id. at 1036. 
267 See id. Other federal statutes such as the Fish and WIldlife Coordination Act (FWCA), 16 
U.S.C. §§ 661~66(c) (1994), and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 4321-4370(d) (1994), have the potential to be used to advance watershed protection goals 
given their emphasis on evaluating environmental impacts in a comprehensive fashion. How-
ever, each statute is primarily used to guide substantive decision making with other statutes; 
without such a statute for watershed protection, their use is limited. See Adler, supra note 14, 
at 1049. Similarly, although the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994), 
requires protection of habitat in certain cirCllmstances, the ESA offers protection only when an 
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d. President Clinton's 1998 Clean Water Initiative 
In his January 27,1998, State of the Union Address, President Bill 
Clinton presented his new Clean Water Initiative-a comprehensive 
outline of strengthening CWA standards, improving inter-agency co-
operation on clean water, and focusing on watersheds as the building 
blocks of clean water policy.268 
This Clean Water Action Plan (CWAP) focuses on watersheds as 
the most efficient framework for dealing with multifaceted water 
resource protection issues.269 The President's watershed approach in-
volves four key elements. First, the plan calls for a unified effort of 
states, tribes, and the federal government in identifying watersheds 
that require immediate assistance, pristine watersheds that need pro-
tection to preserve their wild character, and threatened watersheds 
that need extra attention.270 This unified approach in information gath-
ering should improve leveraging of scarce resources and allow for 
increased efficiency in meeting current regulatory standards.271 
The second key element is cooperation among local communities, 
the public, and federal agencies to develop strategies to clean up 
watershed ecosystems that currently fail clean water and natural 
resource goalS.272 Funding will be provided in the FY 1999 Clean 
Water and Water Restoration Budget Initiative to assist with this 
process.273 The third element is pollution prevention.274 The CWAP 
endangered species has been identified. See id. at 1054. Finally, although the Safe Drinking 
Water Act (SDWA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-j (1994), provides for protection of underground drinking 
water with a focus on all sources of pollution, as with the ESA, this Act is limited as it is only 
useful if the underground water supply is used for drinking water. See id. at 1058. However, the 
SDWA does have one section that allows states to choose between watershed protection 
projects and water filtration to maintain clean drinking water from reservoirs. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 300g-1(b)(7)(C)(i). This provision encourages states to implement watershed protection strate-
gies to avoid the high cost of water filtration projects. See id.j National Primary Drinking Water 
Regulations,40 C.F.R. § 141.71 (1998). This option, however, is voluntary. In Massachusetts, for 
example, the State Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) has promoted a watershed 
protection approach to the Quabbin and Wachusett reservoirs that provide drinking water for 
the greater Boston area. The state is nevertheless still being sued by EPA to build a costly 
multi-million dollar filtration plant. 
268 U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, CLEAN WATER ACTION PLAN: RESTORING AND PRo-
TECTING AMERICA'S WATERS (1998) (visited Apr. 14, 1998) <http://www.epa.gov/cleanwater/> 
[hereinafter EPA WATERSHED PLAN]. 
269 See id. at Ch. III. 
2'10 See id. at Overview. 
271 See id. 
2'i2See id. 
273 See EPA WATERSHED PLAN, supra note 268, at Overview. 
274 See id. 
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calls for protecting pristine areas as the most cost-effective strategy 
for meeting clean water goals.276 
The final element involves funding.276 Federal agencies will provide 
small grants to local organizations who wish to take a leadership role 
in fostering local efforts to restore and protect watersheds.277 This will 
include an increase in section 319 grants from $105 million in FY 1998 
to $200 million in FY 1999.278 
These four key elements to watershed protection will operate in a 
framework of increased participation by local "stakeholders"-resi-
dents, organizations, businesses, and government agencies that live, 
work, and operate at the locallevel.279 This "bottom-up" approach is 
reflected in many of the state and federal watershed management 
plans, and will encourage not only greater participation in goal setting 
and identifying water quality problems, but will also increase the 
acceptance of regulatory changes or landuse restrictions that might 
follow during implementation.280 
Finally, the President's CWAP seeks to combine the forces of the 
federal agencies, while encouraging, through grants and organiza-
tional and technical assistance, local communities to work together on 
a watershed basis.281 
2. State Watershed Management Initiatives 
The three following state and regional programs outline some com-
mon goals and problems that arise with a watershed approach to 
managing water resources.282 First, the Chesapeake Bay Program is 
a regional agreement involving section 117 of the CWA.283 Second, the 
Puget Sound initiative is a state program to address the institutional 
and political barriers to protecting Puget Sound from pollution.284 
Finally, the New York City drinking water protection program is a 
276 See id. 
276 See id. 
277 See id. 
278 See EPA WATERSHED PLAN, supra note 268, at Overview. This should somewhat 
strengthen the section 319 program discussed in Part I supra. 
279 See id. at Ch. III. 
280 See id. 
281 See id. 
282 Chesapeake Bay Program, Puget Sound Initiative, and the New York City Drinking Water 
Program. 
283 See Adler, supra note 14, at 1071. 
284 See generally Katherine Fletcher, Protecting Puget Sound: An Experi7nent in Regional 
Governance, 65 WASH. L. REV. 359 (1990). 
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classic example of conflicting goals and priorities between discrete 
political groups within a state.286 
a. Chesapeake Bay Program 
Section 117 of the CWA,286 in concert with the 1983 and 1987 Chesa-
peake Bay Agreements (the Agreement),287 created an interstate 
covenant outlining a series of goals, including a commitment by the 
signatories to reduce nutrient inflows into Chesapeake Bay by forty 
percent by the year 2000.288 
In addition to the nutrient reduction goal, the Agreement recog-
nizes the important link between land use, growth control, and water 
quality.289 A multidisciplinary panel was convened to set goals for the 
sound management of land and sustainable development of the Ches-
apeake Bay watershed.290 This report identified six priorities for pro-
tecting the Bay through improved land use.291 First, the report called 
for concentrating development in suitable areas; second, sensitive 
areas were to be protected; third, development should be directed to 
existing population areas to protect pristine and agricultural areas; 
fourth, the report urged creating a ''universal ethic" to protect the 
Bay and its ecosystem; fifth, enhancement of recycling and resource 
conservation was called for; and sixth, the report encouraged funding 
to support these goals.292 
Although the Agreement did not suffer from a lack of public par-
ticipation and bottom-up goal setting, implementation of the stated 
goals has not kept up with the aggressive planning.293 
286 See u.s. Envtl. Protection Agency, WATERSHED PROGRESS: NEW YORK CITY WATERSHED 
AGREEMENT, EPA 840-F-96-005 (Dec. 1996) (last modified Feb. 27, 1997) <http://www. 
epa.gov/OWOW/watershedlny/nycityfi.html> [hereinafter NY REPORT]. 
288 Chesapeake Bay Program, 33 U.S.C. § 1267 (1994). 
287 See Adler, supra note 14, at 1071. 
288 See id. Maryland and Virginia were the initial parties to the agreement; Pennsylvania was 
added in 1985. See id. 
289 See id. at 1072. 
290 See id. 
291 See id. at 1072 n.607. 
292 See Adler, supra note 14, at 1072 n.607. 
293 See id. The public participation process involved more than 50 subgroups and committees. 
See id. However, even the organizers admit that implementation is far behind. Even the 40% 
reduction in nutrient loading is behind schedule. See id. at 1071 (citing CHESAPEAKE BAY 
FOUND., A REVIEW OF THE CHESAPEAKE BAY PROGRAM'S FIRST DECADE AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONS FOR THE FUTURE (1993». 
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b. Puget Sound, Washington 
In 1983 the Washington State legislature created a citizen commis-
sion (the Commission) to study the health of Puget Sound and make 
recommendations for its cleanup.294 The initial findings of this group, 
which led to the creation of the Puget Sound Water Quality Authority, 
concluded that the water quality problems of the Sound involved a 
complex web of jurisdictions, and a multitude of individual decisions 
and activities by landowners, government actors, and individual citi-
zens.296 In addition, the Commission cited a lack of coordination and 
focus between the individuals and groups responsible for polluting 
and protecting the Sound.296 
Because sources of pollution were diverse,297 and jurisdiction was a 
maze of conflicting agencies and tribal organizations, a comprehensive 
management plan for Puget Sound was established to address both 
the diversity of pollution and the political and institutional problems 
facing the Sound.298 With regard to pollution, all sources, from point 
sources then covered by NPDES permits, to polluted runoff, storm-
water pollution, and wetlands degradation, were covered by the 
plan.299 
To defeat the institutional problems, the management plan not only 
involved the public in goal-setting and implementation, but also at-
tempted to integrate agency action to prevent jurisdictional con-
flicts.300 
Because successful implementation of watershed protection in-
volves landuse controls that often create a public backlash, the man-
agement plan involved a large public education project.301 The educa-
294 S66 Fletcher, supra note 284, at 362. Puget Sound stretches from the Canadian border 
south to Olympia, Washington and includes 40 separate ports. S66 id. at 363. The Puget Sound's 
watershed includes 12 counties, more than 100 cities, and 14 Native American tribes. S66 id. 
296 S66 id. at 362 (citing PUGET SoUND WATER QUALITY AUTH., ANNUAL REPORT I (1984». 
296 S66 id. The Commission documented serious threats to the health ofPuget Sound, including 
closing of shellfish beds due to disease-causing bacteria from human waste sources. In addition, 
more than half of the Sound's wetlands had been altered or destroyed by development, and toxic 
concentrations in the sediment at the bottom ofthe Sound posed the greatest long-term threat 
to the clean up. S66 Fletcher, supra note 284, at 365. 
2lf1 See id. Pollution sources included industrial and municipal point source discharges, con-
taminated urban and rural runoff, failed septic systems, combined sewer overflows from waste-
water treatment facilities, and discharges from boats. See id. 
296 See id. at 366. 
2911 See Fletcher, supra note 284, at 366--67. 
300 See id. 
sell See id. 
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tional efforts included local "field agents" conducting outreach educa-
tion on watershed protection, educational information available in 
public places, small grants to grassroots organizations, outreach to the 
business community, and hands-on projects involving children.302 
As of 1990, the Puget Sound Management Plan had resulted in the 
identification of twelve "early action" watersheds for priority non-
point source pollution programs.3OS Forty-eight public education pro-
grams that reached more than one million residents of the watershed 
had been completed.304 Also, many substantive actions had reached 
implementation, including a tightening of state regulation of point 
sources, new water testing facilities to provide accurate monitoring 
of the effectiveness of the new pollution controls, wetlands acquisi-
tions in pristine areas, and the development of an ongoing shellfish 
testing program.306 
In 1994, following another round of public hearings, the Puget 
Sound Water Quality Authority released a new report outlining the 
biggest threats to water quality in Puget Sound.306 The release of the 
Authority's recommendations was met with skepticism by environ-
mentalists who criticized the Authority for focusing too much on 
planning and not enough on action.307 Under the Puget Sound Man-
agement Plan, the Authority did not have the regulatory power to 
force the state to take action, and thus, environmentalists contended 
that without a legal mandate to back up the recommendations of the 
Authority, further delays in implementation were likely.3°S 
Finally, in 1996, the Washington state legislature abolished the 
Puget Sound Water Quality Authority and its citizens' governing 
board, and replaced it with a "Puget Sound Action Team" consisting 
of ten state agency directors and other political appointees.309 This 
attempt to remove power from the Authority forced the environ-
mental community to file an initiative petition to address the political 
frailty of the Puget Sound Management Plan.310 
300 See id. at 366. 
303 See id. at 369. 
304 See Fletcher, supra note 284, at 370. 
306 See id. 
306 See Sandi Doughton, Controls on Runoff, Septic Use Proposed, NEWS TRIBUNE, Mar. 3, 
1994, at Bl. 
3(17 See id. 
308 See id. 
309 See People for Puget Sound, Just Haw Bad is Our Legislature, (last modified Mar. 1, 1998) 
<http://www.pugetsound.org/newsletter/n0896/newsletter0896.htm>. 
310 See id. 
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c. New York City Watershed Protection Plan 
On January 21,1997, EPA granted a five-year waiver to New York 
City for construction of a $6 billion drinking water filtration plant.3ll 
This compromise followed four years of negotiations between the city 
of New York, EPA, and the upland communities that surround New 
York City's drinking water reservoirs.312 
The pressure from EPA to build a filtration plant was in response 
to water quality testing that showed alarming levels of microbial 
pathogens and phosphorus originating from both point-wastewater 
discharges and nonpoint urban and rural runoff.313 A group was con-
vened to negotiate a watershed approach to address this pollution so 
as to avoid a costly filtration plant.314 This working group contained 
representatives from the state, the city, the watershed communities, 
EPA, and environmental groupS.315 
Ten months of negotiations resulted in a watershed protection plan 
in which the city of New York would purchase sensitive land to 
protect the reservoirs, conduct more extensive water quality testing, 
support city/upstate partnership programs to develop better waste-
water treatment facilities and help promote alternative economic de-
velopment in the watershed communities.316 The state of New York 
agreed to adopt the city's watershed protection regulations on land 
use and promised to enforce them in the watershed communities.317 
Watershed residents were allowed either to develop their property 
as the new regulations allowed, or to sell their land to the city.3lB 
Although the agreement was praised by such environmental or-
ganizations as the Hudson Riverkeeper Fund, represented by Robert 
F. Kennedy, Jr., some organizations, such as the National Resources 
Defense Council, criticized the agreement as the product more of 
311 See Associated Press, Pact Signed to Protect NYC Water Supply, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 
1997, at B2. 
312 See NY REPORT, supra note 285. New York City owned less than four percent of the land 
in the Delaware and Catskill watershed, an area of approximately 1900 square miles. See 
Andrew Revkin, Troubled Waters-A Special Report, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1997, § 1, at 1. 
313 See NY REPORT, supra note 285. 
314 See id. 
315 See id. 
316 See id. 
317 See id. 
318 See NY REPORT, supra note 285. The agreement ended more than a dozen existing lawsuits 
brought by aggrieved landowners that had claimed the draft regulations proposed by New York 
City violated "home rule" and were therefore takings of property without compensation. See 
Andrew C. Revkin, Watershed Protection Agreement Is Praised, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1996, at 
B3. 
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political than of ecological pressure.319 However, even critics found the 
agreement to be not only a positive first step in protecting the reser-
voir watersheds in upstate New York, but also a successful negotia-
tion that forced compromise resulting in action, as opposed to mere 
planning.320 
The Chesapeake Bay Program, Puget Sound Initiative, and the 
New York City drinking water protection program are examples of 
state efforts to protect water resources that addressed the institu-
tional and political barriers often ignored by traditional regulatory 
solutions. By confronting conflicting goals and priorities between dis-
crete social and political groups, these state efforts have attempted, 
with varying success, to develop a new mechanism to protect water 
resources. 
v. CASE STUDY: MASSACHUSETl'S WATERSHED INITIATIVE 
In 1993, then Secretary of the Executive Office of Environmental 
Affairs (EOEA) of Massachusetts, Trudy Coxe, along with environ-
mental, civic, and other municipal groups, launched the Massachusetts 
Watershed Initiative (MWI) to better identify environmental prob-
lems and improve the delivery of state agency services.321 The MWI 
is a community-based management approach that encourages local 
individuals, groups, businesses, and municipal officials to set priorities 
for environmental protection within their respective watersheds.322 
These local groups, called ''basin teams" or "watershed teams," create 
an inventory of local environmental priorities; this information forms 
the basis of recommendations to the Secretary of EOEA to set budg-
eting priorities among the state environmental agencies.323 This infor-
mation is used to improve coordination among the state environ-
mental agencies, prevent duplication of efforts between agencies 
encourage involvement of local stakeholders in environmental man-
agement, and enhance awareness of state environmental protection 
efforts.324 Moreover, this framework seeks to achieve measurable im-
provements in water quality, protect and restore wildlife habitat, 
improve public access to waterways, improve local control over water 
319 See Revkin, myra note 318, at B3. 
SIlO See ill. 
321 U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, WATERSHED PROGRESS: MASSACHUSETrS' AP-
PROACH, EPA 840-F-96--004 1 (Feb. 1997) [hereinafter EPA PROGRESS]. 
322 See ill. 
323 See PAULA JEWELL, THE MASSACHUSETl'S WATERSHED INITlATIVE: OPPORTUNITIES 
AND CHALLENGES IN RESHAPING GoVERNMENT (1998) (on file with author). 
324 See EPA PROGRESS, myra note 221, at 2. 
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resources, and encourage shared responsibility for sustainable water 
resource management.325 
Confronting these laudable goals are several accepted challenges 
that the MWI must overcome, such as the political, institutional, and 
social barriers to watershed protection discussed earlier in.this Com-
ment.326 First and foremost, the MWI seeks to realign the state agen-
cies responsible for environmental resource protection to eliminate 
waste, redundancy and conflict and to focus agency action on local 
environmental priorities.327 Also, individuals, industry, and municipal 
officials are encouraged to plan and operate within a watershed frame-
work, as opposed to within municipal boundaries.328 Finally, sound 
scientific research is to be developed to give authority to proposed 
reallocation of resources due to identified environmental problems.329 
A. Neponset River Watershed Pilot Project 
The first step in implementing the MWI began in December of 1994 
in the Neponset River Watershed.330 State and federal agencies met 
with representatives of local environmental organizations, municipal 
officials and business leaders to identify environmental problems in 
the Neponset River watershed.331 In addition to identifying environ-
mental problems in the Neponset watershed, this pilot program was 
to test the effectiveness of watershed-based management, to identify 
conflicts between the participating "stakeholders" that gathered to 
discuss environmental priorities, and to outline a water resource man-
agement scheme that could be replicated statewide.332 
The public meetings and educational events involving a broad range 
of interested individuals and groups from within the watershed re-
sulted in several small successes, as well as several large victories for 
water resource protection.333 A legal agreement was reached to clean 
up a hazardous waste site, sewer line leaks responsible for elevated 
325 See id. at 3. 
326 See supra notes 205-20 and accompanying text. 
827 See Jewell, supra note 323, at 1. 
828 See id. 
1129 See id. 
330 The Neponset River Watershed is located south and west of Boston-the Neponset River 
begins in Foxboro, Mass. and flows 30 miles through 14 municipalities to Dorchester Bay in 
Boston. See Jeff McLaughlin, Rediscovering the Neponset River, BOSTON GLOBE, May 5, 1996, 
at South Weekly, 1. 
331 See EPA PROGRESS, supra note 321, at 1. 
332 See id. at 1-2. 
333 See id. 
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bacteria counts in the Neponset River were fixed, and the owner of a 
horse racing track agreed to reduce soil erosion from the track site.334 
In addition, the city of Boston agreed to eliminate hundreds of illegal 
sewer hookups that were dumping untreated sewerage into the N e-
ponset River estuary.336 
In addition to these concrete improvements to the water quality of 
the Neponset River Watershed, the public education campaign 
greatly increased public awareness of watershed-based management. 
The entire process strengthened the Neponset River Watershed As-
sociation, a nonprofit environmental organization that continues to 
coordinate environmental resource planning under the MWI.336 
Because of the initial success of the Neponset pilot program, then 
Secretary Coxe moved to implement the Massachusetts Watershed 
Initiative on a statewide scale.337 Understanding how the statewide 
MWI will work requires a discussion of the proposed structure of this 
watershed management proposal. 
B. Structure of the Massachusetts Watershed Initiative 
The MWI framework is divided into three main segments: first, 
"Resource Allocation" is a process to determine the allocation offinan-
cial resources among the environmental agencies within the Massa-
chusetts Executive Office of Environmental Affairs (EOEA); second, 
"Stakeholder/Science Input" will collect information on scientific and 
ecological processes and local conditions to identify environmental 
protection goals within each watershed; and third, "Implementation" 
is a process of applying the proposed changes to agency resource 
allocation and local environmental planning, as well as evaluating the 
outcome of specific projects to determine the success of the MWI in 
addressing watershed based challenges.338 
The link that connects these three segments is the "watershed 
team," consisting of a full-time staff person from EOEA and residents 
of the local watershed communities.339 The watershed teams identify 
3:K See id. 
335 See id. at 2. 
336 See Jewell, supra note 323, at 3. 
837 See id. at 4. 
336 See id. 
339 These "community partners" include environmental organizations, citizen "stream teams," 
small local groups that collect water quality data and participate in hands-on environmental 
protection efforts, municipal officials and members of the business community. See EPA PRO-
GRESS, supra note 321, at 2. 
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environmental priorities and make suggestions as to how the re-
sources within EOEA should be allocated.340 A watershed team cur-
rently exists for twenty of Massachusetts's twenty-seven watershed 
basins.341 
1. Segment One: EOEA Agency Resource Allocation 
In the Resource Allocation segment, these watershed teams report 
to a watershed "roundtable," which consists of senior level managers 
from the state environmental agencies and individuals from the com-
munities.342 This roundtable resolves disputes concerning allocation of 
resources among the environmental agencies and makes final recom-
mendations to the Secretary of EOEA, who incorporates the sugges-
tions of the watershed teams and watershed roundtables into the 
annual budget.343 This segment of the MWI is concerned with how to 
make the existing resources within EOEA more responsive to the 
needs of local watersheds. Therefore, if in one year a significant num-
ber of watershed teams report to the Secretary that land acquisition 
is a priority, then the Secretary can divert more resources in that 
annual budget to land protection programs.344 
2. Segment Two: Stakeholder/Science Input 
In the second segment, stakeholder/science input, the watershed 
teams tap into the local knowledge of the community members of the 
watershed team to evaluate the environmental priorities for the wa-
tershed. The teams then collect scientific information to assist in 
developing strategies to address these environmental goals.346 There-
fore, in this segment, the watershed teams not only make annual 
recommendations to the Secretary for agency resource allocation, but 
they also develop a five-year plan for ultimately protecting and re-
storing the ecological health of the entire watershed.346 
340 See id. at 5. 
1141 Massachusetts is unique in that a private, nonprofit "watershed association," a local water-
shed-based environmental organization, exists for each of the state's 27 watersheds. See EPA 
PROGRESS, supra note 321, at 1. 
342 See Jewell, supra note 323, at 6. 
1143 See Interview with Ed Himlan, supra note 171. 
344 See id. This means, of course, that the constituents of the other programs within EOEA 
that see their programs cut are likely to be unhappy. However, the goal of the MWI is to have 
many of these constituencies involved in the basin teams, so conflicts over resource allocation 
will be resolved at the local level, not during the state budget process. See id. 
345 See Jewell, supra note 323, at 6. 
346 See id. 
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This five-year plan includes a year each of outreach, research, as-
sessment, planning and implementation, and evaluation.347 During the 
outreach year, the watershed team will encourage participation of the 
broadest possible group of local officials, environmentalists, and busi-
ness leaders in order to educate them of the need for watershed-based 
management, and the benefits of the MWI.348 
During the research year, the watershed teams will collect informa-
tion regarding the unique environmental resource protection issues 
facing their watershed, and this information will be assessed during 
the third year.349 The teams establish and implement a plan during 
year four and evaluate that plan during year five.360 
The watershed teams then begin the process again by continuing 
to identify new participants in the team, collecting new information 
on the health of the watershed, and establishing new plans for pro-
tecting the watershed resources.361 This five-year cycle is meant to be 
flexible and to provide a framework for action-not necessarily a 
concrete timeline.362 This cycle may be modified to best address the 
local needs of the watershed.363 
3. Segment Three: Implementation 
The final goal of the MWI is for the watershed teams to lead to the 
permanent establishment of local "Watershed Community Councils" 
(WCCS).364 These WCCs would continue to gather information and set 
priorities for protecting their watersheds, and the results of these 
local projects would be used by the teams to continue to improve 
the efficiency and effectiveness of state environmental agency re-
sources.366 
C. Next Steps for the Massachusetts Watershed Initiative 
Several lessons can be learned from both the Neponset pilot project 
and the early stages of statewide implementation of the MWI. As the 
347 See id. 
348 See Interview with Ed Himlan, supra note 171. 
349 See id. 
SIiOSee id. 
361 See id. 
362 See id. 
363 See Interview with Ed Hirnlan, supra note 171. 
364 See EPA PROGRESS, supra note 321, at 2. 
366 See Jewell, supra note 323, at 6. 
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front line contact with the communities, the role of the teams should 
be further strengthened. Furthermore, additional funding for obtain-
ing scientific data to support local decisions is crucial to the success 
of the MWI, and more education is necessary to encourage individu-
als, municipalities and businesses to think about environmental pro-
tection in a watershed context.3OO 
1. Refinement and Enhancement of Watershed Teams 
In early 1998, Massachusetts EOEA Secretary Trudy Coxe an-
nounced the appointment of twenty-seven full-time watershed team 
leaders.357 Accompanying the elevation of the team leader to full-time 
status, the Secretary committed $2 million for the MWI, including 
$700,000 for grants to watershed groups, $100,000 for training of the 
team leaders, and $600,000 for a science and technical center to pro-
vide necessary data for the watershed teams to make informed rec-
ommendations to the environmental agencies.3OO 
2. Development of Science and Technology Center 
With the assistance of the $600,000 proposed for FY 1999, the 
development of a science and technology center will be important to 
ground policy decisions in real information regarding the health of the 
watershed.359 This information, collected by state and federal environ-
mental agencies as well as volunteer "stream teams," would form the 
factual basis for agency recommendations and environmental action.3OO 
3. Creating a Watershed Ethic 
Currently, state and federal environmental agency funds are often 
spent without a general public awareness of the benefits to environ-
mental protection.361 Subsequently, when environmental laws are re-
viewed in Congress or in the state legislatures, public support may 
not be sufficient to ensure that the statutes remain in force.362 
366 See id. at 6-8. 
357 See Executive Office of Envtl. Affairs, Coxe Announces Statewide Watershed Basin Team 
Leaders, (visited Mar. 2,1998) <http://www.magnet.state.ma.us/envir/newslbtl.htm>. 
358 See Secretary of Executive Office of Envtl. Affairs Trudy Coxe, Remarks to Watershed 
Basin Team Leaders (visited Mar. 2,1998) <http://www.magnet.state.ma.uslenvir/tcbtl.htm>. 
359 See Jewell, supra note 323, at 6. 
360 See id. 
361 See Interview with Ed Himlan, supra note 171. 
362 See id. 
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In addition, many individuals, municipalities, and businesses are 
unaware of how their actions affect the overall health of the water-
shed. The MWI seeks to both involve local stakeholders in identifying 
environmental priorities and educate these stakeholders about how 
the watershed works-how their behavior affects environmental re-
sources.363 
The MWI seeks to encourage the public to think along watershed 
lines, overcome resistance to addressing environmental problems in 
new ways, and resolve conflicts in a setting of mutual respect.364 
VI. ANALYSIS OF MWI IN THE CONTEXT OF PAST ATTEMPI'S AT 
WATERSHED MANAGEMENT 
To analyze the strengths and limitations of the MWI, the initiative 
may be compared against past attempts at watershed management. 
In order to succeed, a watershed management program must address 
the ecological, political and social barriers that traditionally present a 
challenge to new forms of environmental resource protection.366 
A. Issues Raised in Past Watershed Management Programs 
1. Ecological Issues 
The MWl's focus is to structure the programs at the state agency 
level to conform to the needs of the individual watersheds.366 The role 
of the volunteer "stream teams," collecting information about local 
water quality, combined with the establishment of a science and tech-
nology center, seeks to create an accurate method of measuring the 
health of the watershed.367 
The MWI therefore intends to cater to the ecological needs of the 
entire watershed. This approach is comprehensive, utilizing available 
data to structure state agency action to promote cooperation and 
coordinated effort to maximize the return on the taxpayer dollar.368 
This bottom-up, nonregulatory approach places the ecological health 
of the watershed as the primary goal. This approach is in contrast to 
the piecemeal method of passing legislation or allocating scarce 
363 See id. 
1164 See Jewell, supra note 323, at 1. 
866 See Adler, supra note 14, at 991. 
366 See EPA PROGRESS, supra note 321, at 1. 
367 See id. at 2. 
366 See Jewell, supra note 323, at 1. 
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agency dollars to those interest groups that may be the strongest at 
anyone time. Therefore, the MWI has structured its operative frame-
work to maximize, to the extent possible, the ecological benefit to the 
environment.369 
2. Institutional and Political Resistance 
The MWI framework addresses the institutional and political resis-
tance that traditionally has thwarted watershed management pro-
jects. It does so, in part, by limiting its focus. This narrow focus may 
have positive effects by increasing the likelihood that the MWI will 
succeed where other programs have failed. 
In order to meet the stated goals of protecting environmental re-
sources, the MWI primarily addresses state-level decisionmaking. 
Given that the leader of the environmental agencies is the main pro-
ponent of the MWI, it is likely that this project will survive the 
inter-agency power struggles that arise when resources and respon-
sibilities are restructured.370 As recommendations for allocating 
agency resources are sent up the chain of command from the water-
shed teams, the Roundtable, composed of the heads of the environ-
mental agencies, can debate the recommendations before making a 
final recommendation to the Secretary, who has the power to resolve 
inter-agency conflicts as the Secretary of the environmental agencies. 
Therefore, the MWI has incorporated into its framework an internal 
check to prevent inter-agency conflict from jeopardizing the goals of 
the MWI.371 
However, although it is reasonable to begin with only the state's 
jurisdiction over environmental protection, eventually the MWI must 
be expanded to deal with local as well as state environmental policies. 
Massachusetts is a "home rule" state that allows cities and towns to 
pass local environmental bylaws. Accordingly, the watershed teams 
will need to incorporate local bylaws, as well as federal statutes and 
regulations, to create a fully comprehensive fr~mework for allocating 
resources for environmental protection. 
369 See id. at 2. 
870 As of the time of publication, Trudy Coxe will have left EOEA to take a position in historic 
preservation in Rhode Island. Watershed advocates are applauding the appointment of Massa-
chusetts State Senator Robert Durand, a long-time defender of the environment and supporter 
of the MWI, as Coxe's successor. 
871 See Jewell, supra note 323, at 5. 
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3. Individual Behavior 
Traditional command and control environmental regulation often 
deals with the actions of large economic entities such as industry, 
municipalities or government. When environmental regulation begins 
to interfere with individual behavior, such as building homes or driv-
ing automobiles, public resistance increases. 
The MWI intends to involve a sufficient number of local stakehold-
ers in the decisionmaking process to encourage consensus for any 
decision.372 By developing comprehensive and respected Watershed 
Community Councils and watershed teams, the MWI hopes to encour-
age acceptance of environmental regulations by allowing local indi-
viduals and groups to participate in the creation of regulations.373 
Although the MWI has a strong focus on community education and 
involvement, at a certain point environmental protection might re-
quire a greater sacrifice by the local stakeholders. Hopefully this 
event will coincide with complete local participation in the develop-
ment of watershed-based environmental policy. This will encourage 
individuals to alter their behavior because they understand the role 
that each plays in protecting the environment.374 
CONCLUSION 
In spite of the billions of dollars spent by industry and municipali-
ties under the CWA, the quality of our waterways continues to de-
cline. This is in part attributable to nonpoint source pollution that is 
currently not regulated as closely as point source discharges. Given 
the poor track record of the CWA in addressing the problem of non-
point sourc.e pollution, an alternative to the traditional command and 
control legislation is needed. 
Although in its early stages, the Massachusetts Watershed Initia-
tive promises to improve upon the watershed-based management 
programs of the past by encouraging local individuals and groups to 
identify environmental threats and work together to prioritize 
cleanup efforts. The MWI seeks measurable improvements in envi-
ronmental quality by educating local stakeholders about the ecological 
needs of the watershed, while encouraging everyone concerned with 
environmental protection or environmental regulation to share the 
3'l2 See EPA PROGRESS, supra note 321, at 2. 
873 See Jewell, supra note 323, at l. 
874 See id. at 8. 
386 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 26:339 
responsibility of keeping our water resources clean. The continued 
attention to the ecological, institutional, and social challenges of past 
watershed management programs may improve the chance that the 
MWI will succeed where other efforts have failed. 
